Eternity variables are introduced to specify and verify serializability of transactions of a distributed database. Eternity variables are a new kind of auxiliary variables. They do not occur in the implementation but are used in specification and verification. Elsewhere it has been proved that eternity variables in combination with history variables are semantically complete for proving refinement relations.
Introduction
The 26th Lake Arrowhead Workshop, held in September 1987, was devoted to the question: "How will we specify concurrent systems in the year 2000?" The participants were provided with an informal description of a serializable database interface and invited to present a formal specification at the meeting. The workshop resulted in five papers published in Distributed Computing 6, 1992. Schneider [18] introduces the setting and the informal description. There are three proposed solutions by Broy [4] , Kurki-Suonio [10] , and Lam and Shankar [11] . Finally, Lamport [12] discusses the solutions. He argues that verification methods should allow for the prophecy variables introduced by Abadi and Lamport in [1] , since that is the way to get a semantically complete method. Yet, the combination of history variables and prophecy variables is proved to be complete in [1] only under certain finiteness assumptions. Prophecy variables are not very well known or often used.
Our approach to the database problem indeed asks for variables with some kind of prescient capabilities. The prophecies needed are a choice of a value for the database and of a transaction number. Since prophecy variables with infinite choices are unsound [1] , application of prophecy variables would require to specify beforehand that the state space of the database is finite. This is a heavy condition: since the state space is constant, finiteness of the state space implies boundedness. It would therefore require not only that the database always has finite contents, but even that the number of objects that can be stored is bounded. It would also require bounds on the transaction numbers, while we would prefer to allow the database to support infinitely many transactions.
We rejected the option to change the specification in order to ease the proof of correctness of the implementation. Instead of this, we invented another kind of auxiliary variables with "prescient" behaviour, so-called eternity variables. In [7, 8] , we show that the verification method based on eternity variables in combination with forward simulations is semantically complete, in a slightly stronger sense than the combination of prophecy variables and history variables of [1] .
There is nothing magical about eternity variables. An eternity variable is just an auxiliary variable that is initialized nondeterministically and that is never modified. Eternity variables have two kinds of roles. In specifications, the value of the eternity variable together with a supplementary property can be used to rule out unwanted behaviours. In verifications of refinement, its value is constrained by a relation with the state, the so-called behaviour restriction, which can be used as an invariant provided that it is satisfiable for every behaviour of the program.
The behaviour restriction is responsible for the aspects that may seem prophetic to the operationally reasoning programmer. The soundness of extension with eternity variables is a rather easy consequence of the behaviour restriction. The complications of the prophecy variables of [1] are mainly due to the choice to rely on König's lemma rather than on something like a behaviour restriction. Indeed, the behaviour restriction may look like a heavy and unmanageable condition, but in this paper we show that it can be used effectively to handle the classical practical problem of the serializable database interface.
Overview. In Section 2, we develop the formal computational model. We generalize (weaken) the concept of invariants and introduce backward invariants which in some sense formalize the validity of prophecies. We introduce eternity variables to prove refinement relations between specifications.
Section 3 contains an informal description of the serializable database interface of [18] . In Section 4, we develop our formal specification, using an eternity variable to formalize serializability. The implementation of [18] based on locking objects is described in Section 5.
Section 6 contains the verification of this implementation. Here, the eternity variable of the specification gets its value as a limit of a history variable. A second eternity variable is introduced to prescribe the success and the order of the transactions of the database. In Section 7, we describe the verification of our proof with the first-order mechanical theorem prover NQTHM. We draw conclusions in Section 8. The new results are in the Sections 2, 4, 6, and 7.
The Formal Computational Model
In this section, we present the formal model, which is a semantical version of Lamport's TLA [1, 13] without the syntactic restrictions and conventions. We generalize the concept of invariance and introduce a new proof rule for so-called backward invariance. We briefly present the simulation theory we proposed at MPC 2002 [7] . The paper [7] contains an error in the completeness result, which has been corrected in [8] (submitted). In the present paper we only need and prove soundness of eternity extensions.
This section is rather heavy. We refer to [8] for a more balanced presentation of the theory with more examples.
We use lists to represent consecutive states during computations. The elements of a list xs are xs i for i ≥ 0. If X is a set, we write X ω for the set of infinite lists over X. If f is a function X → Y then f ω : X ω → Y ω is the function lifted to infinite lists. If s is a finite list, s ω stands for the list obtained by concatenating infinitely many copies of s.
For infinite lists xs and ys, we define xs to be a stuttering of ys, iff xs is obtained from ys by consecutive repetition of certain elements. For example, with X containing a, b, and c, the infinite list (aaabbbc) ω is a stuttering of (abbc) ω . A subset P of X ω is called a property [1] over X iff, whenever xs is a stuttering of ys, we have xs ∈ P if and only if ys ∈ P .
For a subset P of X ω , we write ¬P to denote its complement (negation). We write Suf (xs) to denote the set of infinite suffixes of an infinite list xs. We define 2P (always P ), and 3P (sometime P ) as the subsets of X ω given by xs ∈ 2P ≡ Suf (xs) ⊆ P ,
If P is a property then ¬ P , 2P , and 3P are properties. For a subset U of X, we define the set 
Specifications and invariants
A specification in the sense of [1, 7, 8] is a tuple K = (X, Y, N, P ) that consists of a state space X, a subset Y ⊆ X that holds the initial states, a reflexive relation N ⊆ X × X, and a supplementary property P ⊆ X ω . It is required that P is, indeed, a property.
The elements of X are called states. Relation N is called the next-state relation or step relation. We define an execution of K to be a list xs of states for which every pair of consecutive elements belongs to N . Reflexivity of N serves to allow or eliminate stuttering: if xs is an execution, any list ys obtained from xs by repeating elements of xs and possibly removing duplicates from xs is an execution as well. An execution of K is called initial iff xs 0 ∈ Y . Property P is intended to express fairness and progress requirements. We define a behaviour of K to be an infinite and initial execution xs of K with xs ∈ P . We write Beh(K) to denote the set of behaviours of K. We thus have
A state is called reachable iff it occurs in an initial execution. A set of states is called a forward invariant iff it contains all reachable states. A state is called occurring iff it occurs in some behaviour. A set of states is called an invariant iff it contains all occurring states. Since every occurring state is reachable, every forward invariant is an invariant.
The specification is called machine closed [1] if every finite initial execution can be extended to a behaviour (an element of Beh(K)). If the specification is machine closed, all reachable states are occurring and the concepts of invariant and forward invariant are equivalent, and there is no reason to distinguish between them. In this paper, however, we encounter specifications that are not machine closed. The following example provides a simple case.
Example A. Consider the program (or rather specification) var n : Int := 0 ; do n = 0 → choose n ∈ Int ; [] n = 0 → n := n − 2 od ; prop: infinitely often n = 6 .
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This is modelled by the specification K = (X, Y, N, P ) with X = Z and Y = {0}. The step relation N consists of the pairs (n, n ) with n = 0 or n = n − 2 or n = n (to allow stuttering). The supplementary property is P = 23[[ {6} ]], which consists of the lists of natural numbers that contain infinitely many numbers 6. Informally, it is obvious that n must remain even (and nonnegative) in order to satisfy the property. Therefore, the set D of the even integers is an invariant. It is not a forward invariant since it does not contain the reachable states 3 and −1. 2
Proof rules for invariants
A set D of states is called a strong invariant (or inductive [15] ) iff D contains the initial set Y and satisfies x ∈ D for every pair (x, x ) ∈ N with x ∈ D. It is easy to verify that a strong invariant contains all reachable states and is therefore a forward invariant.
The theory is most easily formulated in terms of sets of states, but for programming it is more convenient to use state predicates, i.e., boolean functions on the state space. We therefore identify a state predicate Q with the corresponding set (Q) = {x ∈ X | Q(x)}. Predicate Q is called an invariant if and only if the set (Q) is an invariant.
Inspired by [15] , we use the following notation to ease our calculations. Recall that K = (X, Y, N, P ) with Y ⊆ X and N ⊆ X × X. Let fst and snd be the two projection functions from X × X to X. For any set Z and a state function g : X → Z, we define g 0 = g • fst : N → Z and g + = g • snd : N → Z. By convention, the superscript 0 is omitted. It results that function g + on N stands for the value of g in the post-state whereas g itself stands for the pre-state value.
When E is some boolean function on a set W , we define W |= E to mean that all elements w ∈ W satisfy E(w). As a first application, we see that a predicate Q is a strong invariant iff Y |= Q and N |= (Q ⇒ Q + ). The classical way to prove that a family of predicates (J i ) i is a family of invariants (e.g., see [15] or [5] 3.1) is to prove
Writing J = (∀ i :: J i ), the first condition implies that J holds initially. The second condition implies that J is stable. It follows that J is a strong invariant, so that J and all its conjuncts J i are forward invariants. We shall use the following easy variation of this rule.
Proof. We have to prove that D(xs n ) holds for every behaviour xs and every index n. Let xs be given. We use induction on n. Since xs is a behaviour, D(xs 0 ) holds because of Y |= D. We have D(xs n )⇒D(xs n+1 ) because of J(xs n ) and
The reader may also verify that, in this lemma, D is a forward invariant if J is a forward invariant. When forward invariants are not good enough, we need a proof rule for invariants in which the supplementary property plays a role. We therefore define a predicate A to be an attractor iff Beh(K) ⊆ 23[[ A ]] or, equivalently, iff A(xs n ) holds infinitely often for every behaviour xs.
(1) Lemma. Let J 0 , J 1 , J 2 be invariants. Let A be an attractor. Let Q be a predicate such that
Then Q is an invariant.
Proof. We have to prove that Q(xs n ) holds for every behaviour xs and every index n. Let xs and n be given. Since A is an attractor there is m ≥ n with A(xs m ). Since J 0 is an invariant, assumption (a) implies that Q(xs m ) holds. Since J 1 and J 2 are invariants, assumption (b) implies that Q(xs k )⇐Q(xs k+1 ) for every index k. Therefore Q(xs n ) follows from Q(xs m ) by m − n backward steps. 2
In the applications of Lemmas (0) and (1), we often omit the components X |= and N |=, since the state space and step relation are supposed to be self evident.
Example A, continued. In the setting of example A, we have D = (Q) for the predicate Q given by Q : n mod 2 = 0. We use the attractor A : n = 6. It is clear that
So, taking the invariants J i = true, Lemma (1) implies that Q is an invariant. 2
Invariants obtained by the above lemma might be described as backward invariants, but we attach no formal meaning to this since we impose no conditions on the kind of invariance of
Remark. It may be tempting to use or propose a mixed rule that would conclude invariance of J and Q from the assumptions Y |= J , and X |= (A⇒Q) for some attractor A, and
This proposal is unsound! For example, consider the program var n : Nat := 0 ; do true → n := n + 1 od ; prop: infinitely often n > 9 .
This program is modelled by the specification K = (X, Y, N, P ) with X = N and Y = {0}. Relation N consists of the pairs (n, n ) with n ∈ {n, n + 1}. Property P consists of the lists of natural numbers that contain infinitely many numbers > 9. We use the attractor A : n > 9, and the predicates J : n = 0 and Q : n > 9. The premises of the proposed rule hold trivially, since both J ∧ Q and J ∧ Q + are identically false, but of course neither J nor Q is an invariant. 2
Implementation and simulation
Since we need to relate different specifications, we introduce the notations states(
A specification becomes visible by giving a function to observe the states. In practice, the set states(K) is usually a subset of a cartesian product V × M , where V is spanned by so-called visible variables and M is spanned by auxiliary variables. In that case, the projection function fst : states(K) → V is used to observe the states. The auxiliary variables that span M are called hidden. A hidden variable that may be initialized nondeterministically and is never modified thereafter, is called an eternity variable. The following example shows that eternity variables can be used for specification.
whh282a -6
Example B. Consider the program var n : Int := 0 , m : Int ; do true → n := n + 1 od ; prop: eventually always n = m . This is modelled by the specification K = (X, Y, N, P ) with X = Z × Z and Y = {0} × Z. The step relation N consists of the pairs ((n, m), (n , m)) with n ∈ {n, n + 1}. The supplementary property is P = 32 [[ n = m ]]. This expresses that the program terminates in a state with n = m. Let us assume that m is a hidden variable. Then, it is an eternity variable. It serves here to specify termination. 2
It is useful to regard visibility in a more abstract way. A visible specification is defined as a pair (K, g) consisting of a specification K and a function g on states(K) that serves to observe the states. The visible behaviours of (K, g) are the infinite lists g ω (xs) with xs ∈ Beh(K). Let (K, g) and (L, h) be visible specifications with g and h mapping to the same set. We then define (K, g) to implement (L, h) iff every visible behaviour of (K, g) is a visible behaviour of (L, h), i.e., iff for every xs ∈ Beh(K) there exists ys ∈ Beh(L) with g ω (xs) = h ω (ys). This concept of implementation is inspired by the one of [1] , but it is slightly stricter: in [1] it is allowed that a visible behaviour of (K, g) only becomes a visible behaviour of (L, h) after adding stutterings.
We use simulations to prove implementation relations between visible specifications. There are several versions of different generality.
Let K and L be specifications. A function f :
and (f (x), f (x )) ∈ step(L) for every pair (x, x ) ∈ step(K), and f ω (xs) ∈ prop(L) for every xs ∈ Beh(K). Refinement mappings form the simplest way to compare different specifications.
We define a binary relation F between states(K) and states(L) to be a simulation K − L [7, 8] iff, for every behaviour xs ∈ Beh(K), there exists a behaviour ys ∈ Beh(L) with (xs n , ys n ) ∈ F for all n. Simulations are relevant for implementation because of the following completeness result.
(2) Theorem [8] . Let (K, g) and (L, h) be visible specifications with g and h mapping to the same set. Then (K, g) implements (L, h) if and only if there is a simulation
We only need the trivial part of this result, viz., that (K, g) implements (L, h) when there is a simulation F : K − L with F ⊆ {(x, y) | g(x) = h(y)}. See [8] for the proof of the converse implication.
The easiest examples of simulations come from subspaces. Indeed, consider a specification K = (X, Y, N, P ) and a set of states R ⊆ X. The subspace restriction
It is easy to verify that K R is a specification and that the identity function 1 R is a refinement mapping from K R to K.
It is also easy to verify that the converse relation 1 R is a simulation K − K R if and only if R is an invariant. In that case, the simulation K − K R is called the associated invariant restriction.
Variable extensions
In programming practice, most simulations occur by extending some program with auxiliary variables. Formally, a specification L is called an extension (or variable extension) of specification K with a variable of a type M iff states(L) is a subset of the cartesian product states(K) × M . The second component of the states of L is then regarded as the variable added. The projection function fst : states(L) → states(K) is often a refinement mapping, but this is usually irrelevant. The extension is called a refinement extension iff the converse relation cvf = cv(fst) is a simulation K − L.
The extension is called a history extension (or an extension with a history variable) iff (H0) For every x ∈ start(K) there is m ∈ M with (x, m) ∈ start(L). (H1) For every pair (x, m) ∈ states(L) and x with (x, x ) ∈ step(K) there is m ∈ M with ((x, m), (x , m )) ∈ step(L). (H2) prop(L) consists of the lists ys with fst ω (ys) ∈ prop(K). It is easy to see that, if L is a history extension of K, relation cvf is a simulation K − L, e.g., [8] . So, every history extension is a refinement extension. History extensions go back to [17] where history variables are called auxiliary variables.
Eternity extensions, introduced in [7, 8] , are another kind of variable extensions. The starting point is the trivial history extension KξM of K by M , in which the variable added is never modified and does not interact:
So, the state space is extended with an unknown nondeterministic constant m ∈ M , in other words with an eternity variable m. A binary relation R between states(K) and M (i.e. a subset of states(KξM )) is called a behaviour restriction between K and M iff, for every behaviour xs of K, there exists an m ∈ M with (xs i , m) ∈ R for all indices i :
If R is a behaviour restriction between K and M , we define the corresponding eternity extension as the subspace restriction W = (KξM ) R of the trivial history extension KξM . So, we have states(W ) = R, and start(W ), step(W ), and prop(W ) are the natural restrictions of start(KξM ), step(KξM ), and prop(KξM ) to R or its liftings. The soundness of eternity extensions is expressed in the following easy result:
(3) Lemma [8] . Let R be a behaviour restriction. Then relation cvf is a simulation K − W .
Proof. Let xs ∈ Beh(K). We have to construct ys ∈ Beh(W ) with (xs, ys) ∈ cvf ω . By (BR), we can choose m with (xs i , m) ∈ R for all i. Then we define ys i = (xs i , m). A trivial verification shows that the list ys constructed in this way is a behaviour of W with (xs, ys) ∈ cvf ω . This proves that cvf is a simulation. 2
We refer to [8] for a presentation of the theory with more examples. In [8] , it is also proved (using a slightly different terminology) that the combination of history extensions and eternity extensions is in a certain sense semantically complete: every simulation that also "preserves quiescence" is a composition of a history extension, an eternity extension and a refinement mapping.
In Section 4 below, we use an eternity variable in a specification. Backward invariants and eternity extensions will be used in Section 6.
An Informal Description of a Database Interface
We come back to the database interface mentioned in the introduction. The following description is extracted from [18] , see also [4, 10, 11] .
A database is a system of objects that can be read and written by a collection of client processes. Each client process performs a sequence of transactions, where a transaction consists of a sequence of reads and writes to database objects. Clients may concurrently execute transactions. Transactions may be aborted either by the client or by the database. The result of aborting a transaction is as if none of the reads and writes of the transaction were executed. Serializability means that the values returned by all the read operations from successful transactions are ones that could be obtained by executing these transactions in some sequential order: an order in which all reads and writes of one transaction are performed before any operation of the next transaction is performed.
We also impose a weak restriction on the serialization order in terms of the temporal order of the transactions: we require that for every behaviour it is possible to insert a unique serialization event into every successful transaction such that the serialization order corresponds to the temporal order of serialization events. The paper [18] does not mention such a requirement and thus allows the implementor more freedom of implementation. We don't know whether this was intended.
A client accesses the database by the following procedure calls. It must wait for the return of a call before issuing another call. Different clients may issue concurrent calls.
Begin-T(): key or failed
Called to initiate a transaction. The value returned is a key to identify the transaction in the other calls. The call may only fail because of some lack of resources.
Read(key, object): value or abort This returns the current value of the object in the database, unless the transaction is aborted.
Write(key, object, value): ok or abort Writes value to object and returns ok, unless the transaction is aborted.
End-T(key): ok or abort Ends the transaction with ok, unless it is aborted by the database.
Abort(key)
Aborts the transaction; this is always successful.
We allow a key of a transaction that has been terminated or aborted to be reused. The last four calls only occur with a key of an active transaction, i.e., one that has begun more recently than it has been terminated or aborted (if ever).
The procedures Read, Write and End-T may only be aborted by the database if the transaction accesses an object that is concurrently accessed in some other transaction. It is assumed that, if a transaction is not aborted, the client will terminate it by a call to End-T after a finite number of calls. Under this assumption, the database guarantees that control eventually returns from each procedure call.
Remark. The successful transactions must be serialized while retaining the order of the actions within each transaction. The order of actions from different transactions may be changed. Consider, for example, the following scenario where the database contains an integer object x, initially x = 17. Client A has a private variable a and performs the transaction that consists of a := x followed by x := a + 1. Client B performs the transaction that consists of the single write action x := 8. When the transactions of A and B overlap, the transactions may be aborted. When both transactions succeed, the pair (a, x) in the final state can be either (17, 8) or (8, 9) . whh282a -9
The Specification of the Database
In this section we develop a formal specification. We begin with the introduction of the main state variables and a discussion of the flow of control in Section 4.1. We model the clients of the database as a nondeterministic environment in Section 4.2. The database is specified by means of an abstract program in 4.3. We convert this program in a relational specification in 4.4. We justify the specification in Section 4.5.
Main state variables and global control
The database to be implemented has an environment which we do not control. This environment repeatedly submits invocations to the database that belong to some key. For simplicity and uniformity, we assume that Begin-T just chooses an unused key, independently of the database system. We assume that Begin-T is called only when such an unused key is available. It therefore never leads to immediate abort.
Even though keys can be reused, we allow the set of available keys to be infinite. A key becomes known when the environment starts using it. Initially, there are no known keys. The set of known keys can only grow, but it remains finite.
The invocations for reading and writing are combined and potentially generalized in a set Inv of ordinary invocations. We use additional symbols B, E, A for the special invocations Begin-T, End-T, Abort. Similarly, Res is the set of results of ordinary invocations. We introduce for each key k the variables
The variables associated to key k are called the private variables of k. Indeed, we can regard key k as a process identifier. To distinguish private variables from shared ones, we use slanted font for private variables and typewriter font for shared variables.
The private variable turn.k holds the status of the key; turn.k = 0 means that the key is (still) unknown; turn.k = 1 holds for keys that are known but not in a transaction; turn.k ∈ {2, 3} means that the key is involved in a transaction, with turn.k = 2 when the environment may submit a new invocation and turn.k = 3 when the database has to respond to a current invocation. So, the database can modify turn.k only when it equals 3 and the environment can modify it only when it differs from 3. Once a key k is known, i.e., turn.k = 0, the environment and the database will never reset turn.k to zero. The transitions of turn are described in the following diagram. The database must be fair: it has the obligation eventually to treat every invocation, i.e., to enable the environment infinitely often by setting turn.k to a value = 3. This is formalized in the condition that turn.k always eventually differs from 3, as expressed in the temporal formula
23(turn.k = 3) .
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The private variable inv.k holds the current invocation at key k, whereas res.k holds the latest result at this key. The private variable accessed.k holds the set of objects accessed in the current transaction with key k. We use the convention that accessed.k = ∅ for unknown keys k. The visible variables are inv.k, res.k, turn.k. The variables accessed.k and all variables introduced below only serve in the specification.
Modelling the environment and its expectations
In order to specify the database we model the clients by a very nondeterministic environment that may submit new invocations when turn = 3. Such a new invocation is B when there is no current transaction and = B otherwise. The specification uses a number of auxiliary variables (both shared and private) that need not be implemented but only serve to constrain the visible behaviours of the system.
In order to ensure that all transactions terminate, we specify that, at the start of a transaction of key k, the environment chooses an upper bound evf for the number of nontrivial invocations in the transaction. Of course, the database will not be allowed to inspect or modify evf .
Every key gets a private integer variable nr to hold the number of the current successful transaction in the serialization ordering. It gets its value at some moment during the transaction. This moment is called the serialization event. By convention nr.k = 0 when the current transaction of key k is not successful or before the serialization event. Every key gets a private boolean variable sysAb to indicate that the database is allowed to abort the current transaction. We thus introduce the private variables evf , nr : Int ; sysAb : Boolean .
Since serialization may occur at any time during a transaction, even before the database has answered the invocation B, the environment at k initializes nr.k := 0 when it creates invocation B. Variable sysAb is initialized at this point for the same reason.
We write |inv| for the set of objects to be accessed in invocation inv. In the setting of Section 3, the sets |inv| contain never more than one object. The component command for the environment at key k is given by:
In this guarded command notation, each alternative is regarded as an atomic step that can be taken whenever its guard holds. The command expresses a part of the next-state relation N in the sense of the formal model of Section 2. We use the keyword whenever to emphasize that these steps can be repeated infinitely often. When all guards are false, the component has to wait until (possibly) some other component makes some guard true again. We don't use the do od notation, since that would suggest termination when all guards are false.
Command Env.k expresses the steps the environment at key k can take, when turn.k = 0, 1 or 2. When turn.k = 3, the environment at key k is disabled and has to wait for the database to make some guard true.
In these component programs, we suppress the index k for all private variables of key k. When an unknown key is initialized, its field res is set to A to indicate that it has no previous transaction that delivered meaningful results.
The environment program Env is the parallel composition (|| k Env.k) of the environment programs of all keys. Here, parallel composition is defined as the union (disjunction) of the corresponding next-state relations, i.e., by interleaving semantics. The environment Env is not subject to implementation.
Modelling the abstract database
In this section, we develop the logical database as an abstract program, as a stage towards the relational specification in Section 4.4. We abstract from the objects in the database and their individual values as much as possible. We introduce a set DbVal for the set of states of the total database with the element db0 ∈ DbVal as the initial state. We assume that calls are specified by a function
where (r, w) ∈ DbF(i, v) means that invocation i in database state v may return result r and transform the database state into w. We assume that the set DbF(i, v) is nonempty for every pair i, v. Since we want the specification not to impose any restrictions on the results of failing transactions, we model the database state of a failing transaction by ⊥ / ∈ DbVal and extend function DbF to DbVal ∪ {⊥} by defining DbF(i, ⊥) = {(r, ⊥) | r ∈ Res} for all i ∈ Inv.
We turn to the development of an abstract database program Adb. The implementor of the database has to provide a concrete program Cdb such that every execution of the parallel composition (Env||Cbd), when projected to the visible elements inv.k, res.k, and turn.k for all keys k, is also the projection of some execution of (Env||Adb) for the abstract program Adb. Notice that both parallel compositions are subject to the supplementary property Fdat.
We specify the responses of the database as liberally as possible and yet enforce serializability. We do this by prescribing a highly nondeterministic next-state command, which leads to a deadlocked key when some choices do not fit. The supplementary property Fdat will eliminate executions with deadlocked keys. This means that the abstract specification will not be machine closed, i.e., that there are finite executions that cannot be extended to acceptable behaviour since Fdat cannot be satisfied.
In order to specify serializability, i.e., to enforce some conceptual serialization, we introduce a shared counter gnr and a shared array etMem declared by gnr : Nat := 0 ; etMem : array Nat of DbVal .
It is the intention that successful transaction n transforms etMem[n−1] into etMem [n] and that gnr holds a number of a recent successful transaction. We number the successful transactions from 1 and assume that etMem[0] holds the initial state db0 of the database. The other elements of etMem are initialized nondeterministically. More precisely, the specification allows all behaviours for which there exists a consistent value for etMem. Therefore, etMem is an eternity variable. The identifier etMem is chosen to reflect this fact. If a behaviour contains only a finite number of successful transactions, the unused tail of etMem is irrelevant (it may stutter, but need not do so). We introduce a state function conflict to denote that key k is concurrently accessing a common object with some other key (m):
When conflict(k) holds, the database is allowed to abort k's current transaction. This can be recorded in the private boolean variable sysAb.k.
The next-state command Adb of the abstract database program is the parallel composition (|| k Adb.k) of the component commands for all keys:
As before, we omit references to key k for all private variables. Note that the guards are not mutually exclusive. Any alternative with a true guard can be chosen as a single atomic step. The first alternative (B) is the response of the database to a beginning invocation. This starts with the guess whether the beginning transaction will be successful and, if so, of the initial database state of the new transaction. This initial value is copied into start. Furthermore, result value B is generated and the environment is enabled by setting turn to 2.
The second alternative (I) is the ordinary invocation. If val = ⊥, the results are nondeterministic and val remains ⊥ because of the definition of DbF(i, ⊥).
Alternative (A) allows a failing transaction to abort either upon the client's request or because of concurrent object access during the transaction. It can only happen when the current transaction has not yet been serialized (nr = 0). Alternative (E) is the conclusion of a successful transaction together with tests of the initial and final state of that transaction. It can only occur after serialization, i.e. with nr > 0.
Alternative (S) is the serialization event: the choice of a sequence number during a presumably successful transaction. Alternative (C) is the observation that the database is allowed to abort the current transaction. The variable sysAb is introduced to allow some delay in the abortion. In fact, it may happen that conflict(k) only holds while turn.k = 2; then sysAb.k can be set, so that the database is allowed to abort at the next turn. Notice that the guards of (S) and (C) both imply that the key is in a transaction. whh282a -13
The relational specification
Command Adb specifies the database, but does not provide a convenient test to decide whether or not some proposed implementation is correct. We therefore replace Adb by a relational specification STEP. The above development of Adb only serves as a heuristic justification of STEP.
Command Adb describes the new values of certain variables, while other variables have to remain constant since they are not mentioned. At this point, Adb as developed above is over-specific. So, for the sake of abstractness, we note that the value of res.k is irrelevant while turn.k ∈ {0, 3}. Similarly, the transaction variables start.k, val.k, nr.k, and sysAb.k are irrelevant while turn.k ∈ {0, 1}. To allow for maximal flexibility, we can therefore add an arbitrary nondeterministic choice of a variable whenever turn gets or has a value where that variable is irrelevant.
In the relational specification, we use the following conventions. Recall from Section 2.2 that, for a variable v, we use v for the value of v in the pre-state and v + for its value in the post-state [15] . Inspired by the specification language Z, we write Ξ followed by a list of variables v for the conjunction of equalities v = v + . As before, we omit the index k for the private variables of key k. We use Lamport's TLA convention to add an initial ∧ operator to a list of conjunctions separated by newlines.
As noted in [2] , we have to distinguish between actions of the environment and actions of the database. For this purpose, we introduce a shared variable actor which is set to ENV by every action of the environment and to DB by every action of the database. We regard these modifications of actor as part of the formal setting. So, they need not be included in the specifications.
Since the environment is given and not subject to implementation, we develop a next-state relation STEP for actions of the database, which allows arbitrary actions of the environment.
where adb.k is the next-state relation for key k. The antecedent actor + = DB means that the step is taken by the database. Relation adb.k only allows modifications of the shared variables and the private variables of key k. It is specified by
Here, we require that the database leaves etMem, evf , and inv unchanged since etMem is an eternity variable and the changes of evf and inv are left to the environment. Relation adb.k is further subdivided into relations SpB, SpI, SpA, SpE, SpS, and SpC, which represent the alternatives (B), (I), (A), (E), (S), (C) of command Adb.k, respectively. The begin (B) of a transaction is characterized by
An ordinary invocation (I) is characterized by
Abortion (A) is characterized by whh282a -14
Successful termination (E) is characterized by
Alternative (C) of Adb.k is combined with the possibilities for silent steps in 
Justification of the formal specification
This section is devoted to the question whether the specification of Section 4.4 indeed specifies the informal description of Section 3. In particular, whether it specifies serializability and does not impose undue restrictions on implementations. Of course, the correspondence of a formal specification with an informal description cannot be proved formally. So we cannot give a proof, we can only give convincing arguments.
We use the term history for a sequence of actions in terms of the informal description. We first show that every acceptable history corresponds to a behaviour of the specification. Secondly, we indicate why a behaviour of the specification corresponds to a history that is acceptable for the informal description.
Informal satisfies formal
Firstly, assume that we have an acceptable history. We have to show that this history can occur in the specification. By assumption, the initial state of the history fits the initial state of the specification. The history is a finite or infinite system of terminating transactions. The failing transactions of the history correspond to transactions of the specification where val and start are chosen as ⊥. The specification allows that they have all kinds of intermediate results. The successful transactions can be serialized in some order.
Let m ∈ N ∪ {∞} be the number of successful transactions of the history. Following [14] Section 13.1, we interpret serializability to mean that these transactions can be numbered T n with 1 ≤ n ≤ m such that the history corresponds to sequential execution of T 1 ; T 2 ; T 3 ; . . . and that, for every n, successful transaction T n contains a unique serialization event (S, n) that occurs after its beginning event and before its termination event, in such a way that (S, i) happens before (S, j) whenever i < j.
It follows that there exists a sequence of states (v n ) n of the database such that, for all n ≤ m, state v n−1 is the initial state of T n and v n is the final state of T n . Clearly, v 0 = db0, the initial state of the database.
We now describe the construction of a matching execution of STEP
At the moment of the serialization, we take the step SpS.k for the key k that is executing transaction T n . Using induction, we have gnr = n−1 as a precondition of this step and, in this step, key k sets gnr and nr.k equal to n. After the assignment to nr and due to the choice of etMem[n] = v n , the terminating invocation of the transaction in the history indeed has a corresponding step SpE.k in the specification. This concludes our argument that the informal description satisfies the specification.
Formal satisfies informal
Conversely, consider a behaviour of specification STEP. Every invocation by the environment is eventually answered by the database because of property Fdat. Relation adb shows that the invocations E and A are answered by E or A. Using decrementation of evf , it follows that every transaction of the behaviour terminates.
The transactions with final result E can clearly be pasted together according to the sequence numbers to form an acceptable sequential history of the database with etMem as sequence of global database states. Since they started with database values val.k = ⊥, they yielded results consistent with sequence etMem. These transactions moreover have chosen consecutive sequence numbers nr during their lifetime. This proves serializability.
Finally, a transaction of key k is only aborted by the database if the last invocation was A or if sysAb.k holds which implies that the transaction accessed an object that was also accessed concurrently by another key.
Formal deadlock must be avoided
As announced earlier, the specification is not machine closed: there are finite executions that cannot be extended to acceptable behaviour since fairness property Fdat cannot be satisfied. We need not be concerned about this. In fact, by specifying Fdat, we force the implementor to avoid such executions.
More explicitly, a state where turn.k = 3 holds, has a path to a state with turn.k = 3 only if it satisfies
Indeed, if either of these predicates is false, the process of key k is blocked forever, which implies violation of property Fdat. It follows that, in the proof of correctness of any implementation, the choice of the ghost variable start requires prescience (i.e. knowledge of a later invocation). In Section 6, we show how this can be done.
Implementation by Locking Objects
The implementation proposed in [18] is based on locking objects. So, now the database consists of a set of objects Obj with values in a certain set Value.
DbVal = array Obj of Value
We assume that an invocation consists of an object and some command concerning the object, that the result of the invocation only depends on the command and the value of the object, and that it can only modify this value. So, there is a set ObInv to specify the commands at a given object and the set Inv introduced in 4.1 is henceforth the set of pairs Inv = Obj × ObInv. We assume the responses of the database at all objects to be specified by a function
where (r, t) ∈ ObN (i, u) means that command i for an object with value u may return result r and change the value of the object into t. We assume that ObN (i, u) is always nonempty and that the global next-state function DbF is expressed in terms of ObN by
The set of objects accessed in invocation (o, i) ∈ Inv is naturally defined by |(o, i)| = {o}. The invocations inv ∈ {B, E, A} access no objects and have |inv| = ∅. The set Value has a default element null and the initial database value db0 satisfies db0[o] = null for all objects o. These assumptions are more specific than the general setting of Section 4, but general enough for the setting of [18] as exposed in Section 3. Since every invocation can modify at most one value in the database, there are always at most finitely many objects with values = null, even though the set Obj is allowed to be infinite. According to [18] , the implementation processes interact with the physical database through the following procedures.
procedure Acquire-L(ob : Obj) : Boolean .
The lock is granted iff the procedure returns true; otherwise it is rejected. The lock of one object is never granted to more than one key at the same time. It becomes available again when the owner process calls:
procedure Release-L(ob : Obj) .
A call of Release-L may be issued for an object only after the lock has been granted for that object, in which case the call will eventually return. It is guaranteed that, if every granted lock is eventually released, every call to Acquire-L eventually returns.
We formally specify Acquire-L and Release-L by means of a shared variable Here, self refers to the acting key. The angled brackets mean that the enclosed command is executed atomically. Note that Acquire-L allows the database to wait for some time when the object is unavailable. Indeed, atomicity does not require immediate execution.
We model that a lock can only be released by its owner by defining
The assert means that the programmer must prove that the argument holds.
We use these primitives in the following implementation of the database. The physical database is declared by
The concrete program for the database for key k is given by
The simplest auxiliary procedure is procedure beginTrans () = res := B ; turn := 2 end .
For every key, we declare the private variables ownset : set of Obj := ∅ ; pridb : DbVal .
We use ownset to hold the objects for which the key holds the locks. The current value of such an object ob is kept in pridb[ob] as long as the lock is kept.
Procedure owns serves to verify or guarantee that this key has exclusive access to the object of the invocation. Indeed, since Inv is a cartesian product, we assume that inv = (iob, iv) whenever inv ∈ Inv. In other words, iob and iv are aliases of the two components of inv. Here we use a new procedure releaseAll to release all locks that the key owns, to preserve the invariant concerning ownset, and to transfer control to the environment:
This procedure is also used when aborting:
procedure aborting () = releaseAll() ; res := A ; turn := 1 end .
It is easy to see that the body of Cdb.k always terminates with turn.k = 3. So, if key k acts often enough, the program indeed satisfies the fairness constraint At this point the question is: does this program indeed implement the abstract specification of Section 4? In order to answer this question, we formally define the word "implements" in terms of the observable behaviours of the program and of its specification. A behaviour of a program or specification is an infinite execution sequence that satisfies the fairness constraints. In our case, the observable behaviour is the restriction (projection) of the behaviour to the visible variables inv.k, res.k, and turn.k. The question is then whether every observable behaviour of the program is also some observable behaviour of the specification. We prove this with the new technique of eternity extensions and backward invariants presented in Section 2.
Verification of the Implementation
In order to verify that the code of Section 5 implements the specification of Section 4, we add auxiliary variables to it, both history variables and eternity variables, in a layered manner. The aim is to arrive at a specification that allows an easy projection to the abstract program STEP. We do this by recognizing or inserting components of Env and Adb in the concrete program.
We shall thus again encounter the shared ghost variables gnr and etMem, and the private ghost variables evf , start, val, nr, sysAb, with the same types and initializations as before. We introduce some more ghost variables to guide the choice of the eternity variables.
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Eternity approximated by history
The specification of section 4.4 requires, for every behaviour of the implementation, some value for etMem that satisfies the equalities in SpE.k whenever key k successfully terminates. The implementation of Section 5 does not directly provide a suitable value for etMem. Since etMem is an infinite array, we need not determine etMem all at once, but can determine its elements one by one. So, in order to approximate array etMem, we introduce the shared history variable hiMem : array Nat of DbVal , with hiMem[0] = db0 initially. For every successful transaction, we let the resulting database state be recorded instantaneously in array hiMem at the moment procedure endTrans is called. The prefixes hi and et refer to history and eternity. The idea of "approximation" will be formalized in Section 6.2 below.
A second problem with the specification is that the invocations B are answered in SpI.k by a nondeterministic choice of val or start, which equals ⊥ if and only if the starting transaction will eventually fail. This seems to ask for a prophecy variable. Since our formalism does not provide prophecy variables, we introduce, for every key k, a private eternity variable etSno : array Nat of Nat , such that etSno[i] = n means that the i-th transaction of the key is the n-th successful transaction of the system; etSno[i] = 0 means that the i-th transaction of the key is not successful. In order to approximate etSno, we give each key the private history variables hiSno : array Nat of Nat ; cnt : Nat := 0 ; where cnt counts the transactions the key has been involved in.
Procedure endTrans is extended to:
Here, tlist is a new private variable to hold the objects o for which db[o] has yet to be updated. Commit is a big atomic command that only modifies auxiliary variables. With respect to the implementation, it just adds one stuttering. It determines new values of hiMem, cnt, and hiSno. Since the computation of hiMem is somewhat involved, it uses a private ghost variable ldb, which is not used elsewhere. We also choose this point to include the serialization event SpS.k that increments gnr and copies the result to nr: 
Behaviour restrictions and prophecies
The intention that the history variable hiMem approximates the eternity variable etMem is formally expressed by postulating the behaviour restriction
Here, we universally quantify over the free variable i, which ranges over the natural numbers. Similarly, the relationship between hiSno and etSno is expressed in the behaviour restriction
Extension with eternity variables is only sound when every behaviour allows at least one value for the eternity variable for which the behaviour restriction is satisfied, see condition (BR) in Section 2.4, and [7, 8] . Since gnr and hiMem are modified only in endTrans, the elements of hiMem are written only once and the written elements are those with index ≤ gnr. This implies satisfiability for Rq0. Apart from the fact that hiSno.k and cnt.k are private variables of key k, the argument for Rq1 is similar.
We use etMem and etSno to guide the choice of val when the database answers invocation B. So, on top of the eternity extension, we now introduce private history variables val, start, and mnr, which are modified in the private command 
The state machine
In order to formulate and verify invariants, we have to pin down the atomic commands precisely. We therefore number them and indicate the flow of control by goto commands. As usual, absence of goto means a jump to the next command. Note that every label stands for a single atomic command that may range over several lines. In the invariants, we use a private variable pc as the program counter that holds the label of the next atomic command. The environment has three atomic commands that it executes repeatedly. In principle, unknown keys cannot have private variables. We model them however with pc = 0. It is also convenient to initialize the ghost variables of unknown keys by In the ordinary invocations of a successful transaction, we treat the specification variable val as a copy of the implementation variable pridb. The justification of this will be the most difficult part of the verification. In accordance with alternative (C) of Adb, the specification variable sysAb is set when Acquire-L fails. We thus combine the code of owns and handle in We duplicate the calls of releaseAll in aborting and endTrans. For the ease of the invariants, we replace the for loops that cannot be regarded as atomic with while loops. The while commands 41, 51 and 52 below are the atomic commands to execute the body once and go back to the start of the loop if the guard holds, and to go to the next command if the guard is false. In 42 and 53, the set accessed is made empty in accordance with specifications SpA.k and SpE.k in 4.4. We also reset the ghost variables mnr to 0 and start and val to ⊥. This is allowed by the specifications and convenient for the verification. The level of atomicity is justified by two observations. Firstly, although the environment and the database component at any key are different processes that share several private variables, they do not interfere since they are controlled by a single program counter pc. Secondly, the only non-auxiliary variables shared by all keys are db and owner, which are accessed only in 31, 32, 41, 51, and 52. The double access of owner in 31 is justified by the atomicity postulated for Acquire-L. The accesses in 32, 41, 51, and 52, are single and can therefore be regarded as atomic. Alternatively, the atomicity of the accesses of db in 32 and 51 can also be justified by proving (with the invariants Nq1 and Nq5 in 6.7 below) that the key holds the lock of the object.
At this point, the reader should have verified that the state machine, when projected to the implementation variables db, owner, inv, turn, res, ownset, and pridb, faithfully represents program of Section 5 and that its commands 0, 10, and 15 represent command Env of the environment (see 4.2). In the next subsection, we deal with the question whether it satisfies the specification of 4.4.
We first investigate the state machine's fairness properties. The only backward jumps in this code are those from 21, 33, 42, and 53 to 10 or 15. The loops in 41, 51 and 52 are bounded by the sizes of the finite sets tlist and ownset. All other commands end with a forward jump or are followed by a next command. It follows that, for every key k with pc.k / ∈ {0, 10, 15}, the database process at k needs to do only a bounded number of steps to establish pc.k ∈ {10, 15}. This justifies the concrete fairness assumption Fconc0 : 23(pc.k ∈ {0, 10, 15}) .
In a transaction, the environment eventually chooses all invocations equal to E or A because of evf . Since these invocations are answered by termination of the transaction, it follows that all transactions eventually terminate, i.e.
Fconc1
: 23(pc.k ∈ {0, 10}) .
In the mechanical proof, this argument requires more attention.
The global proof and derived proof obligations
At this point we have rewritten the program of Section 5 and decorated it with actions on ghost variables in such a way that it can be compared with the specification of Section 4. We now reduce the correctness of the program to seven proof obligations Dq0, . . . , Dq6. The obligations Dq0 and Dq1 are easily settled. The obligations Dq2, . . . , Dq6 are treated in the subsections 6.5 up to 6.8.
To summarize what we have done so far, let K0 be the parallel composition of the environment Env with the implementation Cbd of Section 5. In Section 6.1, we extended K0 with history variables gnr, hiMem, cnt, hiSno to a specification K1, with a history extension K0 − K1. By adding eternity variables etMem and etSno with behaviour restrictions Rq0 and Rq1, we got a specification K2 with an eternity extension K1 − K2. Note that, according to the definition in Section 2.4, all states of K2 satisfy the behaviour restrictions Rq0 and Rq1. So, these predicates are invariants, even tautologies. We finally extended K2 with history whh282a -23 variables start, val, nr, accessed, sysAb, mnr, and actor, say to specification K3. The composition yields a refinement extension K0 − K3. Now let L be the abstract specification with next-state relation STEP of Section 4.4. In order to compare K3 with L, we form the forgetful function fg : states(K3) → states(L) that removes all variables that do not occur in L, viz. db, owner, hiMem, pc, iob, iv, pridb, ownset, tlist, evf , cnt, hiSno, etSno, and mnr. Suppose for the moment that fg is a refinement mapping from K3 to L. It would follow that the composition of the refinement extension K0 − K3 with the refinement mapping fg would be a simulation K0 − L. This composition treats the visible variables inv.k, res.k, turn.k as the identity relation. Therefore, Theorem (2) would imply that the concrete program K0 implements specification L.
Unfortunately, fg is not a refinement mapping, since K3 has states that can do steps that do not correspond via fg to steps in L. We claim that these states do not occur in behaviours of K3. We can therefore save the argument by constructing an invariant D of K3 such that the restriction of fg to D is a refinement mapping from the restricted specification K3 D to L. Since the invariant yields a simulation K3 − K3 D , the previous argument suffices to prove that K0 implements the abstract specification L. It thus remains to construct an invariant D of K3 such that the restriction of fg to D is a refinement mapping from K3 D to L.
The state space states(L) is spanned by the visible variables inv.k, res.k, and turn.k, and the specification variables gnr, etMem, accessed.k, start.k, val.k, nr.k, and sysAb.k. Since these variables are initialized in K3 and L in the same way, fg maps start(K3) to start(L).
We now verify that fg maps steps of K3 to steps of L. It is easy to see that the instructions at 20, 30, 32, 40, 41, 51, 52 correspond to stuttering steps of L. The instructions 0, 10, 15 are executed by the environment. Therefore, it remains to prove that the instructions at 21, 31, 33, 42, 50, 53 are mapped to steps of L. We show that these instructions are mapped to steps of L because of certain invariants Dq0, . . . , Dq6. Most of these invariants are not proved here, but only announced as proof obligations to be dealt with later.
Predicate STEP of Section 4.4 has the constituent predicates SpB, SpI, SpA, SpE, SpS, and SpC. Several of these predicates contain the conjunct turn = 3. We therefore observe that our system has the easy invariant
The step at 21 corresponds to alternative SpB.k because of Dq0 and the easy invariant
Dq1
:
Instruction 31 is mapped to a stuttering step if owner[iob.k] = ⊥. Otherwise it contains an assignment to sysAb, which corresponds to the alternative SpC.k if we have the invariant
We claim that instruction 33 corresponds to alternative SpI.k. This gives us the obligation to prove that instruction 33 establishes (res, val) + ∈ DbF(inv, val). If val = ⊥ then val + = ⊥ and hence (res, val) + ∈ DbF(inv, val) because of the definition of DbF(i, ⊥). Since inv = (iob, iv), the definition of DbF in terms of ObN implies that it suffices to prove that, if val = ⊥, instruction 33 satisfies
This would follow from val[iob] = pridb [iob] . It therefore suffices to prove the invariant whh282a -24
Instruction 42 satisfies SpA.k (abortion) if we have the invariant
Instruction 50 corresponds to SpS.k (serialization) if we have the invariant
Instruction 53 corresponds to SpE.k (termination) if we have the invariant
Let D be the universal quantification over all keys k of the conjunction of Dq0 up to Dq6. Function fg maps every step of specification K3 that starts in a state of D to a step of the abstract specification L. Every behaviour of K3 is therefore mapped to an initial execution of L. Every behaviour of K3 satisfies property Fconc0 and hence Fdat because of Dq0, and is therefore mapped to a behaviour of L. This implies that fg is a refinement mapping from the restricted specification
The easy invariance of Dq0 and Dq1 was noticed above. In the next sections we prove that Dq2, Dq3, Dq4, Dq5, Dq6 are indeed invariants. We first apply standard techniques that yield forward invariants and prove Dq2, Dq4, and Dq5. The remaining cases Dq3 and Dq6 need the behaviour restrictions and backward invariants, i.e., applications of Lemmas (0) and (1) of Section 2.2.
As sketched in Section 7 below, the claim that the above proof obligations Dq0 up to Dq6 together imply that the state machine of Section 6.3 satisfies specification STEP of Section 4.4 is mechanically proved in Part 3 of the mechanical proof sdi.events [9] .
The forward invariants
In this section we settle the proof obligations Dq2, Dq4, Dq5, and prove some invariants needed for Dq3 and Dq6. All invariants mentioned in this section are forward invariants, proved by standard techniques. For simplicity in the invariants, we use the convention that ownset.k and tlist.k are empty for unknown keys. The results of this subsection are mechanically proved in Part 4 of sdi.events [9] .
Predicate Dq2 asserts the existence of a conflict when some key, say q, is at 31 and r = owner.(iob.q) is a genuine key (r = ⊥). We prove this conflict by showing that iob.q is a common element of accessed.q and accessed.r and that q = r. The first assertion follows from the invariants
Note that in such invariants we universally quantify over all free variables (here k and o). The inequality q = r follows from the easy invariants
Indeed, Dq2 follows from Jq0, Jq1, Jq2, and Jq3. It therefore remains to prove that these predicates are invariants. They hold initially, since then pc.k = 0 and owner[o] = ⊥. Predicate Jq0 is preserved at 30 because of the easy invariant whh282a -25
Jq1 is preserved at 31 because of Jq0. Its preservation at 42 and 53 follows from Jq3 together with the easy invariant that ownset is empty outside and at the end of transactions:
Jq5 : pc.k ∈ {0, 10, 42, 53} ⇒ ownset.k = ∅ .
Preservation of Jq2 and Jq3 is straightforward. This concludes the proof of Dq2.
We turn to the proofs of Dq4 and Dq5. With respect to nr, it is easy to see the invariance of Kq0 :
pc.k / ∈ {0, 10, 51, 52, 53} ⇒ nr.k = 0 .
Since a key can only arrive at 40 from 20 or 31, we also have the easy invariant
Clearly, Dq4 follows from Kq0 and Kq1, while Dq5 follows from Kq0. It remains to consider Dq3 and Dq6. For Dq3, it is easy to prove the invariants
Preservation of Kq3 at 30 follows from Kq2. We postpone the treatment of the second conjunct of Dq3, since it involves the variable val. The easy part of Dq6 consists of the two easy invariants
It remains to analyze the values of start and val at 33 and 53 for Dq3 and Dq6.
Reduction of the proof obligations
In this section, we settle the remaining proof obligations under assumption of one postulated invariant Yq0. The assertions in this subsection have been formally proved in Part 5 of sdi.events [9] . Since start is modified less often than val, we begin with the analysis of start. Variable start gets its value at 21 by means of mnr. We therefore first prove the straightforward invariants
pc.k ∈ {15, 30, 31, 32, 33, 40, 50}
Preservation of Lq2 at 40 and 50 follows from Lq1.
At this point, we use behaviour restriction Rq1 which says that etSno.
Together with the invariants Lq2 and Kq5, this implies the derived invariant Aq0 :
pc.k ∈ {51, 52, 53} ⇒ mnr.k = nr.k .
Clearly, Lq0, Aq0, and Kq5 together imply
This is the assertion about start in Dq6. Below, we also need that start differs from ⊥ at these locations. Since behaviour restriction Rq0 gives etMem[i] = hiMem[i] for i ≤ gnr, we note the easy invariants whh282a -26
Using Aq1 together with Rq0, Lq3, and Lq4, we thus obtain Aq2 : pc.k ∈ {51, 52, 53} ⇒ start.k = ⊥ .
The key to the analysis of val for Dq3 and Dq6 is the invariant
The proof of this invariant will require backward invariants and is therefore postponed to the next subsection. It is clear that Dq3 follows from Yq0, Kq3, and the easy invariant
Lq5
On the other hand, Dq6 is easily seen to follow from Kq4, Kq5, Aq1, and the postulate
Invariance of Yq1 is threatened only at 51. It is preserved at 51 because of the derived invariant
Aq3
Predicate Aq3 is proved by considering the values of the separate objects in the databases. We first claim the invariants
Mq0
Preservation of Mq0 is easy. Preservation of Mq1 at 33 follows from Lq5.
We now observe that Mq0, Mq1, Yq0, and Aq2, together imply
On the other hand, we have the complicated but straightforward invariant
Mq2
Indeed, Mq2 precisely expresses the assignment to hiMem in 50. Now Aq3 follows by comparison with Mq2, using Aq0, Rq0, Kq5, and Lq3. At this point, we use that the databases val.k and etMem[nr.k] are functions on objects which are equal if (and only if) they yield the same values for every object argument. This concludes the proof of Aq3 and thus of Yq1 and Dq6.
Preparation of the proof of Yq0
In preparation of the proof of Yq0, we note that pridb gets its values from the shared variable db. So, we need to relate db with the ghost variables. The assertions in this subsection have been formally proved in Part 6 of sdi.events [9] . We claim the invariant
Here, we introduce the convention that tlist.k and ownset.k are always empty for the non-existing key ⊥. 
It is preserved at 51 because of the invariants
Predicate Nq1 justifies the assert in Release-L of Section 5. It is an invariant since it is preserved at 32 because of
Preservation of Nq2 is easy. Preservation of Nq3 at 41 and 52 follows from Nq2. Predicate Nq4 is preserved at 50 because of Nq1. Predicate Nq5 is preserved at 30, 41, and 52 because of Nq1.
In the proof of Yq0, we also need two other relatively easy invariants. Firstly, as a variation and consequence of Jq5, we have
As a variation of Kq5 we have the invariant
If pc.k ∈ {41, 42}, then Lq2, Rq1, and Pq1 imply that mnr.k = etSno.k[cnt.k] = hiSno.k[cnt.k] = 0. By Lq0, this gives us start.k = ⊥, thus proving the derived invariant
The mechanical proof for the backward invariants below requires progress. This is based on the invariant
Preservation of Pq2 at 21 and 33 follows from Dq1, Kq2 and the easy invariant
To summarize, using the star * as a wild card, all predicates Dq0, Dq1, Dq2, Dq4, Dq5, Jq*, Kq*, Lq*, Mq*, Nq*, Pq* are forward invariants, independently of the behaviour restrictions Rq0 and Rq1. The behaviour restrictions and the unproved invariant Yq0 have only been used in the proofs of the derived invariants Aq* and in the proof of invariance of Yq1.
Backward invariants
We turn to the proof of Yq0. We leave the comfortable realm of forward invariants. So, all invariants introduced in this section are not forward invariants. The results of this subsection are mechanically proved in Parts 7 and 9 of sdi.events [9] .
The invariance of Yq0 is proved by means of Lemma (0) of Section 2.2, but the auxiliary invariant needed will be proved with Lemma (1). Predicate Yq0 holds initially since then ownset is empty. It is preserved at 21 because of Pq0. Preservation of Yq0 at 32 follows from Mq0 and the new postulate whh282a -28 
This predicate is not a forward invariant, but it is an invariant. This is proved by means of Lemma (1). Indeed, it is implied by the attractor of Fconc0, since that implies that always eventually pc.k = 32. Backward stability is verified by means of the second backward invariant
and the implication
Implication (B0) is proved as follows. Assume that Qz0 does not hold and that key p does a step that establishes Qz0, while Qz1 also holds in the postcondition. First, assume p = k. Then pc.k = 32 and p must execute 50 to modify
This implies iob.k ∈ ownset.p. Then Nq1 and Nq5 together imply p = owner[iob.k] = k. It remains to assume p = k. Then the step modifies pc.k and establishes Qz0. This implies that k executes 32 in a state with start.k = ⊥ while the consequent of Qz0 is false. Since this step adds iob.k to ownset.k, we see that Qz1 is false in the postcondition, contradicting the assumption. This proves (B0).
To prove that Qz1 is a backward invariant, we first note that it is implied by the attractor of Fconc1 because of Jq5: since pc.k ∈ {0, 10} holds infinitely often, ownset is infinitely often empty, and then Qz1 holds, for given k and o. Backward stability of Qz1 is expressed by the implication
which is proved as follows. Given k and o, suppose Qz1 is false and is established by a step of key p. First assume p = k. Then the antecedent of Qz1 holds in the precondition and in the postcondition, and key p executes 50 to modify hiMem[gnr] [o] . It follows that object o is in ownset.k and in ownset.p. Now Nq1 implies p = k. Therefore, assume p = k. Since Qz1 is false in the precondition, the antecedent of Qz1 then holds. By Jq5 and Pq0, this implies that pc.k / ∈ {0, 10, 21, 42, 53}. Also, pc.k / ∈ {51, 52}, and pc.k = 41 by Aq4. It remains to consider pc.k = 50. The precondition has mnr.k = etSno.k[cnt.k + 1] by Lq1. In terms of the precondition, command 50 sets hiSno.k[cnt.k + 1] to gnr + 1. Using that Rq1 holds in the postcondition, we see that the precondition satifies mnr.k − 1 = gnr. Since etMem[gnr] = hiMem[gnr] by Rq0, this shows that Qz1 holds in the precondition, a contradiction that proves (B1).
So, by Lemma (1), the predicates Qz0 and Qz1 are both invariants. Consequently, Aq5 and Yq0 are also invariants. This concludes the correctness proof of the algorithm.
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The Mechanical Proof
In order to illustrate the feasibility of the approach and to verify the validity of the results, I undertook the construction of a mechanical proof with the theorem prover NQTHM 1992 of [3] . Actually, I first used it as the standard tool to verify invariants, and I stopped at the emergence of eternity variables since I mistakenly thought that eternity variables would require a higher-order logic not available in NQTHM. At MPC'02, Ernie Cohen convinced me, however, that it could and should be done with the same prover.
The resulting mechanical proof [9] serves as a witness for the soundness and feasibility of our approach. It also sheds light on some of the formal details of the argument.
We use the set-up for concurrency verification that we described in [6] . This setup had to be extended at several points. Since the values of the eternity variables depend on the specific behaviour, we need the behaviour to construct the values of the eternity variables and we need these values to construct the behaviour. For humans, this raises the danger of circular reasoning, but one cannot fool a sound theorem prover like NQTHM.
A behaviour and its extension
To avoid circular reasoning, we distinguish three levels for the variables in the system. The level Le0 of the concrete implementation has the shared variables db and owner, and the private variables inv, res, turn, pc, evf , pridb, iob, iv, ownset, tlist.
The second level Le1 is the history extension with the shared variables gnr and hiMem and the private variables cnt and hiSno, which serve to approximate the eternity variables etMem and etSno. In the mechanical theory, we regard these eternity variables not as part of the state space, but as constants or rather, since they are infinite arrays, as externally given functions.
The third level Le2 is again a history extension, now with the remaining ghost variables accessed, sysAb, nr, mnr, start, val, and actor.
The first extension of our set-up for the theorem prover was to include the possibility to project a program and its state space to a subset of the spanning variables when the modifications of retained variables only depend on retained variables, and then to prove that the program steps project correspondingly. It is easy to prove that the three levels are correct extensions: the modifications of variables in level Le.i only depend on variables in Le.i.
We postulate some scheduling function round : N → Keys with the property that every occurring key is scheduled infinitely often. This means that, for every n ∈ N, the set of indices i with round(i) = round(n) is infinite. We then construct a corresponding behaviour xs of the system of level Le1 such that xs 0 is the initial state of Le1 and that state xs n+1 is obtained from xs n by a step of key k = round(n + 1). For the ease of the proof of progress, the modelling ensures that this step is non-stuttering unless pc.k = 10.
In order to define the eternity variables etMem and etSno, we prove, for all numbers i, m, n and keys k,
Here, we regard these program variables of level Le1 as state functions, which are applied to the states xs m and xs n . These implications imply that we can define functions etMem and etSno.k on the natural numbers such that, for all numbers i, m and keys k, whh282a -30
In other words, for given behaviour xs, there exist values for etMem and etSno that satisfy the behaviour restrictions Rq0 and Rq1. Actually, this step requires application of a form of the axiom of choice, the soundness of which we cannot prove with the theorem prover NQTHM.
The functions etMem and etSno obtained in this way are now used in the system of level Le2. Let ys be the behaviour of this system obtained by the same scheduling and the same nondeterministic choices as xs. It is easy to see that, for every n, state xs n is the projection of ys n to the state space of Le1.
The relational specification satisfied
As in our previous mechanical proofs, the state machine of Section 6.3 is treated as an essentially deterministic automaton, but for the occurrence of a hidden variable oracle that is consulted and modified whenever a nondeterministic choice has to be made, e.g. see [6] 1.5. This is more convenient than a relational representation since with this set-up the verification of invariants is a matter of rewriting. It also makes it relatively easy to verify that the algorithm used in the prover correctly represents the algorithm discussed here.
In order to mechanize the argument given in Section 6.4, we develop a method to express the specification of Section 4.4 syntactically, in such a way that it can be interpreted by the prover. For this purpose, we define an NQTHM function eval2 that can interpret relations between the state space and the new state space and that can interpret function symbols unchanged for Ξ, and or for ∨, and and for ∧, of arbitrary arity. This function is specialized to a function interpret for the local view of a single process (key).
The specification STEP of Section 4.4 is represented by the definition of a syntactic constant sdi-spec with constituents for the six predicates SpB up to SpC. For example, predicate SpB is represented by (defn sp-begin () '(and (equal turn 3) (equal (new turn) 2) (unchanged gnr accessed nr sysAb) (equal inv 'begin) (equal (new res) 'begin) (equal (new start) (new val)) ) )
The new-state operator, used in turn + , res + , etc., is represented by the function symbol new. The symbol B is represented by 'begin. The semantic function that relates the old state x with the new state y as seen from process q is defined by (sdinext q x y) = (interpret (sdi-shared) (sdi-spec) q x y)
where sdi-shared is the list of shared variables db, owner, gnr, hiMem, and actor.
Part 3 of the mechanical proof sdi.events in [9] proves that the proof obligations Dq0 up to Dq6 are enough to prove that the implementation of Section 6.3 satisfies step relation sdinext.
Analysis of steps
The standard methods of concurrency verification, see e.g. [5, 6, 13, 15, 17] , easily yield that all states ys n of the behaviour ys satisfy the forward invariants of Section 6.5, and in particular the proof obligations Dq0, Dq1, Dq2, Dq4, and Dq5. Actually, we had to use some new techniques to allow for unboundedly many keys, but these were not very surprising and, presumably, comparable to those used in [16] .
Standard techniques were also sufficient to prove the two backward stability assertions (B0) and (B1) of Section 6.8. Apart from the implicit dependence via the eternity variables, all these results are independent of the particular behaviour.
Progress formalized with expanding functions
The next step is the application of Lemma (2) of Section 2.2. With a higher-order prover, e.g., as PVS, it would be preferable to prove Lemma (2) first and then apply it. With NQTHM, however, we prefer to prove the particular application directly, since the existential quantification hidden in the condition Beh(K) ⊆ 23[[ A ]] must be expressed constructively. Our constructive formalization is based on expanding functions, defined as follows.
A function f : N → N is called expanding iff n ≤ f (n) for all n. It is called strictly expanding iff n < f (n) for all n. Most of our progress properties are proved with Theorem. Let functions P , Q : N → B and g, vf : N → N be given such that g is expanding and (a) P (n) ⇒ P (n + 1) ∨ Q(n + 1), (b) P (n) ⇒ vf (n) ≥ vf (n + 1) , (c) P (n) ∧ P (g(n)) ⇒ vf (g(n)) > vf (g(n + 1)) . Then there is an expanding function G with P (n) ⇒ Q(G(n)), which can be constructed explicitly.
This theorem is mathematically fairly obvious and can also be readily proved with
NQTHM.
The requirement that, for every n ∈ N, the set of indices i with round(i) = round(n) is infinite, is formalized by postulating the existence of a strictly expanding function h : N → N with round(h(n)) = round(n) for all n.
For any key k, the fairness condition Fconc0: 23(pc.k ∈ {0, 10, 15}) is formalized by means of an expanding function H with the property pc.k(ys H(n) ) ∈ {0, 10, 15} for all numbers n. This is proved by a direct application of the above theorem with vf (n) = vfk(ys n ) where the state function vfk is given by vfk = ( pc.k ∈ {20, 50} ? 2 · (#ownset.k) + 60 − pc.k : pc.k = 51 ? #ownset.k + #tlist.k + 60 − pc.k : pc.k ∈ {30, 31, 40, 41, 42, 52, 52} ? #ownset.k + 60 − pc.k : pc.k ∈ {32, 33} ? 60 − pc.k : pc.k ∈ {0, 10, 15} ? 0 ) .
It is clear that vfk remains constant when some key = k takes a step and that it decreases when pc.k / ∈ {10, 15} and key k itself takes a step. For any key k, the fairness condition Fconc1: 23(pc.k ∈ {0, 10}) is formalized and sharpened by constructing an expanding function K with the property pc.k(ys n ) = 0 ⇒ pc.k(ys K(n) ) = 10 .
The mechanical proof of this result is based on the above theorem, the previous result, and the ghost variable evf that is decremented by instruction 15. The invariant Pq2 implies that it can be used to construct a variant function.
In order to prove validity of backward invariants, we prove the following constructive version of Lemma (2).
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Theorem. Consider functions Q, R : N → B such that Q(n + 1) ⇒ Q(n) and R(n) ⇒ Q(n) for all n. Let g be an expanding function such that ¬ R(n) ⇒ Q(g(n)) for all n. Then Q(n) holds for all n ∈ N.
This theorem is used in conjunction with (B0) and (B1) to prove that all states ys n satisfy the predicates Qz0 and Qz1. Using standard arguments we finally obtain that all states ys n satisfy the other invariants mentioned in Section 6.8 and the proof obligations Dq3 and Dq6. This completes the proof that behaviour ys satisfies the specification of Section 4.4.
Overview of the proof
The proof consists of two NQTHM event files newprelude and sdi. Such event files are written by the human verifier and verified by NQTHM. They contain all hints the prover needs for the verification. So, a human reader with access to the prover can easily inspect all details of the proof. The file newprelude is the prelude for shared-variable concurrency. It has about 800 lines, mainly devoted to extension with history variables. The file sdi has about 4960 lines.
The first 800 lines of sdi are devoted to the algorithm and its two behaviours as discussed in Section 7.1. Roughly 600 lines are needed for the semantic lemmas that describe how each variable is modified in every step. The syntactic form of the algorithm is easy to compare with the description in this paper. The semantic lemmas make the verifications of invariants much faster and much more convenient. Another 500 lines are devoted to the specification as described in Section 7.2. This part culminates in the seven proof obligations Dq*.
The main effort is in the standard analysis described in Section 7.3. It takes 400 lines to construct and prove the forward invariants of Section 6.5, Section 6.6 requires around 350 lines. The treatment of Section 6.7 together with the construction and initialization of one global strong invariant requires 870 lines. The proof of Yq0 and the implications (B0) and (B1) of Section 6.8 require roughly 500 lines. We finally need another 700 lines to prove progress and 200 lines for the validity of the backward invariants as discussed in Section 7.4. This part concludes with the final correctness assertion that the nth step of behaviour ys as induced by the acting key (round (add1 n)) is conform the specification:
(sdinext (round (add1 n)) (ys n) (ys (add1 n))) Indeed, we count the states from 0 and the steps from 1.
NQTHM's verification of the complete events file takes less than nine minutes on a Pentium 4. After that, minor modifications of the proof can be verified or falsified much faster.
Conclusions
For the verification of refinement in concurrency, eternity variables form an important and viable mechanism. In our case, the main burden is still done with history variables and (standard) forward invariants, but critical parts are verified with eternity variables. Here safety can rely on progress arguments via backward invariants.
We needed eternity variables in the specification of serializability since serializability is expressed in terms of complete behaviours. It is therefore not surprising that we also needed eternity variables in the proof. A second array of eternity variables etSno was needed, however, to connect private data with the shared database.
The feasibility of the approach and the validity of the results are witnessed by the mechanical verification [9] with the first-order theorem prover NQTHM.
